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NOTE
United States v. Posado: The Fifth Circuit Applies Daubert to
Polygraph Evidence
I. FACTS
The three defendants in United States v. Posado' were arrested at Houston
International Airport while waiting to board their flight and were charged with
conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute in excess of five
kilograms of cocaine. The defendants later claimed the law enforcement officers
who arrested them searched their bags before obtaining their consent. They
moved to suppress the evidence based on the Fourth Amendment.:' The officers,
however, claimed they obtained consent both orally and in writing before
searching the bags and finding cocaine. To support the truth of their assertions
regarding the circumstances of the search, the defendants arranged to undergo
polygraph examinations. They informed the prosecution of this intention, invited
the prosecution to participate in the tests, and offered to stipulate that the results
would be admissible for all purposes. The prosecution declined. The defendants
proceeded with the polygraph examinations. Each defendant submitted to two
polygraph examinations by two separate examiners. Both sets of results
indicated that the defendants were telling the truth.'
Thereafter, the defendants requested that the polygraph examiners be allowed
to testify at the suppression hearing or, in the alternative, that a hearing be held
to determine the admissibility of the polygraph evidence under the: Federal Rules
of Evidence and the guidelines established by the United States S upreme Court
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 The defendants' proffer
included the, polygraph results, the qualifications of the two examiners and the
affidavit of a third polygraph expert in support of the general reliability of the
polygraph technique. The district court summarily refused to allow the
polygraph evidence and refused to hold the requested evidentiary hearing. The
district court then conducted the suppression hearing and denied the motion to
suppress, finding that the defendants knowingly and voluntarily consented to a
search before the bags were opened.' The defendants were tried and convicted
on both counts. They appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. Held: The district court erred in applying a per se rule against the
admissibility of polygraph evidence. Therefore, "the district court's ruling on the
motion to suppress is [reversed], the defendants' convictions are! [vacated) and
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW Rvmw.
1. 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995). .
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961) and its progenty.
3. Id. at430-31.
4. 509 U.S. 579. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
5. Posado, 57 F.3d at 431.
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the case is [remanded] to the district court for consideration of the evidentiary
reliability and relevance of the polygraph evidence proffered by the defendants
under the principles embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme
Court decision in Daubert.'
Posado is the first case in which a federal court has relied on Daubert to
change its position on the admissibility of polygraph evidence.7 Furthermore,
Posado addresses a highly controversial subject on which the Supreme Court has
never ruled.8 This case not only changes the law for the district courts within the
Fifth Circuit, but is likely to be persuasive to other federal courts and to the many
state courts whose own evidentiary guidelines are based on the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Posado is particularly likely to influence those jurisdictions, such as
Louisiana, which have explicitly announced their intention to be guided by other
courts' interpretations of the Federal Rules or codes of evidence similar to the
Federal Rules.' It is a case which, in its own words, "open[s] a legal Pandora's
box" and "raise[s] as many questions as it answers,"" but nonetheless points the
way in which courts are now likely to go.
II. PRIOR LAW
A. Frye v. United States
The polygraph, commonly known as the "lie detector," does not detect lies.
It measures changes in blood pressure, pulse, respiration and galvanic skin response
(GSR, or sweating). The developers of the polygraph believe these changes are
indicative of the increased stress assumed to accompany the act of lying." A
6. Id. at 436.
7. Conti v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1793 (1995), rejected an appeal of the Tax Court's ruling that unstipulated polygraph evidence was
not admissible. The court determined that it "need not consider whether the Tax Court actually
conducted a proper analysis of the polygraph evidence under the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert"
because the Tax Court based its decision on Sixth Circuit precedent which survived Daubert. Conti, 39
F.3d at 662. United States v. Lech, 895 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), and United States v. Black, 831
F. Supp. 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), rejected similar challenges to the Second Circuit's per se rule against the
admission of polygraph evidence. See infra text accompanying notes 83-95.
8. The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiorari in polygraph cases, most recently in
Conti, 115 S. Ct. 1793. In United States v. Masri, 547 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
907, 98 S. Ct. 309 (1977) (White, I., dissenting), a minority of two justices urged that certiorari be
granted in order to resolve the different approaches to polygraph evidence in the Circuits. A recent
case, Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S. Ct. 7 (1995), discussed the materiality of polygraph evidence
under the Brady rule rather than the admissibility of the evidence itself.
9. See State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1121-22 (La. 1993). But see State v. Beard, 461
S.E.2d 486 (W. Va. 1995), a post-Posado case which reaffirms West Virginia's per se rule against
polygraph evidence.
10. Posado, 57 F.3d at 436.
11. United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1538 (11 th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Johnson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 248 (C.M.A. 1987);
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professional examiner or "polygrapher" is needed to administer the polygraph,
evaluate the results and decide whether truthfulness or deception is indicated."
A party wishing to introduce polygraph evidence does so by tendering the
polygrapher as an expert witness who will testify in the form of an opinion as to the
subject's veracity."
While the polygraph has enjoyed widespread use by employers and law
enforcement agencies in extra-judicial contexts,' 4 it has received a chilly
reception from the courts." Almost all jurisdictions, federal and state, have
until recently chosen to follow Frye v. United States,6 a short, citation-free case
from the then Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The defendant in
Frye, convicted of murder, appealed the trial court decision on the grounds that
the trial court denied his proffer of an expert witness to testify to the exculpatory
results obtained before the trial from a primitive version of today's polygraph.'7
The defendant had even offered to have the proffered witness conduct another
test in the presence of the jury. The Frye court affirmed the conviction based
on its view that this kind of test had "not yet gained such standing and scientific
recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify
the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, develop-
ment, and experiments thus far made."'" The court stated as a general principle
that "while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation-A Technical
Memorandum (U.S. Cong., Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-TM.H-15, Nov. 1983)
[hereinafter OTA]; 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedures
§ 5169 (1978). These assumptions have been only minimally researched. OT4, supra at 6, 96.
12. John E. Reid & Fred E. lnbau, Truth and Deception (2d ed. 1977); 22 Wright & Graham,
supra note 11.
13. 22 Wright & Graham, supra note 11; Development in the Law: Confronting the New
Challenge ofScientfic Evidence, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1481, 1499 (1995).
14. Gipson, 24 M.J. at 249.
15. i McCormick on Evidence § 206 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). 3A Wigmore,
Evidence § 999 (Chadbour rev. 1970 & Supp. 1995) offers an exhaustive, jurisdction-by-jurisdiction
compilation of case law concerning admissibility of polygraph evidence.
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). A minor wave of change began following the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975; e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978)
and United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992) (doing away with Frye in the Second
Circuit); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (overruling Frye in the Third
Circuit); United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246 (C.M.A. 1987) (anticipating Daubert in declaring that
Frye was superseded by the new Military Rules if Evidence, in effect since 1980 and similar to the
Federal Rules).
17. The instrument in Frye measured changes only in systolic blood pressure, whereas today's
polygraph measures changes in both systolic and diastolic blood pressure as well as in pulse,
respiration and galvanic skin response. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d at 428, 434 (5th Cir.
1995); United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1538 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Johnson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
19971
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."" This became known
as the "general acceptance test" or "Frye test." Thereafter, courts adopted this
test not only to exclude polygraph evidence, but to determine the admissibility
of almost all novel evidence claiming to be scientific or technical.2"
B. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit cited Frye in one of its earliest polygraph cases, United
States v. Frogge2 The defendants in Frogge appealed their convictions of
attempted escape from federal custody. They claimed, as an affirmative defense,
that the United States Marshals from whose custody they tried to escape had
accepted a bribe offer from them. The trial court instructed the jury to acquit the
defendants if they believed the bribery evidence. The court refused, however,
to grant the defendants' motion for a court appointed polygraph examination.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, relying on Frye and a United States
Tenth Circuit case' for the proposition that "the rule is well established in
federal criminal cases that the results of lie detector tests are inadmissible." 23
In United States v. Gloria, the Fifth Circuit made clear that its rule against
polygraph evidence was specifically based on the Frye "general acceptance"
rational.24 The defendant underwent a polygraph examination before trial which
supported his version of the events in question, The trial court refused to admit
the polygraph evidence. In rejecting the defendant's appeal, the Fifth Circuit
stated that "American courts have traditionally held such evidence inadmissible
in criminal proceedings on behalf of either the prosecution or the defense
because the polygraph has not yet been accepted by the courts as a scientifically
reliable method of ascertaining truth or deception." 2  The Fifth Circuit
reiterated this approach without additional comment in several subsequent cases
which, like Frogge and Gloria, were all criminal proceedings.2
In Smith v. Gonzales, a civil rights action for false arrest and commitment,
the Fifth Circuit stated that it "need not address the polygraph issue,' 27 but
added in a footnote that "polygraph evidence is inadmissible" and that there is
"no exception to the rule for civil cases, nor for instances where the polygraph
results are purportedly offered for a purpose other than that of asserting the truth
19. Id.
20. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791-92 (1993); United
States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1995).
21. 476 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1973).
22. United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1969).
23. Frogge, 476 F.2d at 970.
24. 494 F.2d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
25. Id.
26. E.g., United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Masri, 547
F.2d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907, 98 S. Ct. 309 (1977); United States v. Cochran, 499
F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1974).
27. 670 F.2d 522, 528 (5th Cir. 1982).
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of the matter contained therein."28 In Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co.,29 also a civil case, the defendant insurance company refused
to pay a fire claim based on its assertion of arson. In support of its assertion,
the insurance company introduced expert testimony based on the results of a
psychological stress evaluation (PSE), a type of "voice stress analysis"
purportedly indicating whether a person is lying by measuring the stress in his
voice.3  The expert testimony in this case indicated that thi, plaintiff store
owner knew, at the very least, that a fire would be set. The trial court allowed
the testimony and in a bench trial found for the defendant. The plaintiff
appealed. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that there was no
relevant distinction between the PSE and the polygraph and holding that expert
testimony based on either technique was inadmissible. The court reiterated its
position that "the polygraph does not command sufficient s:cientific accep-
tance"'" and, while raising the possibility that the Federal Rules of Evidence
might have abolished the Frye test, stated that it "continued to utilize Frye's
'general scientific acceptability' criteria.132 At the same time, the court added
three other reasons for its continued barring of polygraph evidence: (1) the
insufficient reliability of polygraph evidence,33 (2) the risk that the trier of
fact-judge or jury-would "abdicate ... responsibility for determining
credibility, and rely instead upon the assessment of a machine,"34 and (3) the
risk that the trier of fact would give too much weight to polygraph evidence,
which is "shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle
of Delphi.""
Barrel of Fun was the Fifth Circuit's strongest and most detailed expression
of opposition to polygraph evidence. While mainly relying on Frye, it also
stated objections to polygraph evidence which have no comection to Frye.
Significantly, this decision came four years after twelve judges of the Fifth
Circuit (including Judge Tate, who was part of the Barrel of Fun panel) indicated
in United States v. Clark a willingness to reconsider polygralph evidence if a
proffer were made of "evidence tending to show advances in the state of
polygraph art since the seminal opinion in Frye v. United States... upon which
our authorities are based, or the competence of polygraph opeiators."36
28. Id. at 528 n.3.
29. 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984).
30. Id. at 1030 n.3.
31. Id. at 1031.
32. Id. at 1031 n.9.
33. Id. at 1031.
34. Id. (citing United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)).
35. Id. at 1032 (citing United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (C:th Cir. 1975)).
36. 622 F.2d 917, 917 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Gee, J. concurring). United States v. Posado,
57 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 1995), also cites United States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313, 1326 (5th Cir.
1989), as an example of a somewhat "expanded" view of polygraph evidence, but all Lindell states
is that, for Brady rule purposes, impeachment evidence includes the results of a polygraph test.
Lindell has probably been overruled by Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S. Ct. 7 (1995).
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A softening of the Fifth Circuit's position occurred in Bennett v. The City
of Grand Prairie, Texas," the last major statement on the issue before Posado.
Bennett reiterated the rule against the admission of polygraph evidence at trial."
It held, however, that a magistrate could consider polygraph evidence, in
conjunction with other evidence, in determining probable cause for the issuance
of an arrest warrant.39 The Bennett court did not regard this as a true exception
to the rule against polygraph evidence; rather, it saw no point in excluding
polygraph evidence from a determination in which affidavits, hearsay evidence
and evidence received from informants are allowed.' °
The Fifth Circuit's position on polygraph evidence after Bennett can still be
described-as Posado described it-as per se inadmissibility." Bennett
departed from its predecessors only in dicta. The opinion cited cases from other
jurisdictions less hostile to polygraph evidence. 2 Moreover, the court twice
stated that polygraph examinations can correctly detect truth or deception "80 to
90 percent of the time"'-a claim which many observers, then and now, would
regard with skepticism." Bennett also stated that "[u]nlike a lay jury, a
magistrate possesses legal expertise; when determining probable cause, he is
unlikely to be intimidated by claims of scientific authority into assigning an
inappropriate evidentiary value to a polygraph report or to rely excessively on
it."' 5 Perhaps this statement was a response to Barrel of Fun's concern that a
judge as well as a jury might be overinfluenced by polygraph evidence."
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit's position on polygraph evidence remained among
the most exclusionary in the country until Posado.
37. 883 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1989).
38. Id. at 404.
39. Id. at 405-06.
40. Id.
41. United States v. Posado, 57 F,3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 1995).
42. Including United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1989) and McMorris v.
Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 1981). Bennett, 883 F.2d at 405.
43. Bennett, 883 F.2d at 404-05.
44. Attempts to study the reliability and validity of the polygraph have encountered serious and
perhaps insurmountable methodological difficulties. OTA, supra note 1. at 4-8, 95-96; David T.
Lykken, A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of Lie Detectors (198 1); Rex 3. Beaber, Not Guilty
by Reason of Polygraph, 16 U. West L.A. L. Rev. 27 (1984); John C. Kircher et al., Meta-Analysis of
Mock Crime Studies of the Control Question Polygraph Technique, 12 Law and Human Behavior 79
(1988); David C. Raskin, The Polygraph in 1986: Scientific, ProfessionalandLegallssues Surrounding
Application and Acceptance of Polygraph Evidence, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 29. Estimates of reliability
range from below fifty percent to over ninety percent. The most recent of several congressional studies
of polygraph reliability concluded that "no overall measure or single, simple judgment of polygraph
testing validity can be established based on available scientific evidence." CIA, supra note 11, at 4.
Even John E. Reid and Fred E. Inbau, who are among the founding fathers of the modem polygraph,
concede that "[a] statistical determination of the accuracy of the Polygraph technique is practically
impossible." John E. Reid & Fred E. Inbau, Truth and Deception (2d ed. 1984). 1 McCormick, supra
note 15, contains an extensive bibliography of technical literature on the polygraph.
45. Bennett, 883 F.2d at 405.
46. See supra text accompanying note 34.
[Vol. 57
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C. Other Jurisdictions
The Second" and Fourth 8 Circuits, as well as a plurality of' state jurisdic-
tions," have had per se rules similar to that of the Fifth Circuit. The Third,s"
Tenth,"' and D.C.52 Circuits, however, have excluded polygraph evidence
except when elementary fairness requires its admission; i.e., when a criminal
defendant raises an issue the circumstances of which involve a polygraph and the
prosecution is compelled to respond.53 Many jurisdictions otherwise hostile to
polygraph evidence allow it if the parties stipulate in advance that the results will
be admissible and if certain conditions designed to ensure reliability are
observed. Trial courts, however, retain the discretion to exclude polygraph
evidence even if stipulated.5 ' The Sixth, Eighth," and Eleventh57 Circuits
have adopted this approach. Still, some jurisdictions refuse to admit even
stipulated polygraph evidence over an objection.5"
Some jurisdictions which otherwise exclude polygraph evidence allow it
under very limited, specified circumstances even if not stipulated. The Eighth
Circuit allows it to show motive per Federal Rule 404(B) or to impeach
testimony. s9 The Ninth Circuit, which is "uniformly inhospitable" to polygraph
47. United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Bcrtnovsky, 879 F.2d
30 (2d Cir. 1989).
48. United States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1984) (relying on an Eleventh Circuit
decision, United States v. Holman, 680 F.2d 1340 (11 th Cir. 1982), which itself was based on Frye-
influenced precedent which the new Eleventh Circuit inherited from the Fifth Circuit from which it
was created).
49. United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1533-35 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc); I
McCormick, supra note 15.
50. United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1987) (allowing polygraph evidence only
to rebut defendant's claim of coerced confession).
51. United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1986) only allowed the prosecution to
introduce the fact that the defendant failed a polygraph to explain why the police did not conduct a
more thorough investigation; United States v. Hunter, 672 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1982), echoed Frye.
52. Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951), was the original case allowing
polygraph evidence only to rebut defendant's claim of coerced confession; United States v. Skeens,
494 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1974), reaffirmed Frye.
53. See supra notes 50-52.
54. State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894 (Ariz. 1962), is the pioneering case for admitting stipulated
polygraph evidence.
55. The Sixth Circuit's two-step analysis, based on Wolfel v. Holbrook, 823 F.2d 970 (6th Cir.
1987), and Bamier v. Szentmiklosi, 810 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1987), and realffrmed in Conti v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995),
generally excludes polygraph evidence, but allows it if stipulated with prior notice and commitment
to abide by the result.
56. United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1975).
57. United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (1Ith Cir. 1989) (en ban(;).
58. E.g., People v. Monigan, 390 N.E.2d 562 (11. App. Ct. 1979); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d
39 (W. Va. 1979); Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
59. Underwood v. Colonial Penn. Insurance Co., 888 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1989).
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evidence because of its "overwhelming potential for prejudice," has suggested it
might allow it "for a limited purpose that is unrelated to the substantive
correctness of the results."'6  The Eleventh Circuit also allows polygraph
evidence to impeach or corroborate testimony, but requires notice to the opposing
party. In addition, the opposing party must be given an opportunity to arrange
its own polygraph, after which admission of the evidence is still discretionary.6'
Louisiana, interestingly, which has traditionally excluded polygraph evidence at
trial, appears to allow it in post-trial proceedings.62
A few jurisdictions give substantial discretion to trial courts to admit or
exclude polygraph evidence. The First Circuit63 and Seventh Circuit" general-
ly disfavor polygraph evidence but allow the trial court discretion, though "for
the most part that discretion has been exercised to exclude the evidence."6
New Mexico is the only jurisdiction to allow polygraph evidence for all
purposes, subject only to statutory provisions designed to ensure reliability and
to the sound discretion of the trial court."
D. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
The "Frye test" is no longer "good law." It survived, old and frayed but still
formidable, until 1993, when the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,67 a case involving expert scientific testimony
60. United States v. Miller. 874 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1989) (partly citing Brown v. Darcy,
783 F.2d 1389, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1986)).
61. United States v. Piccinona, 885 F.2d 1529 (1 Ith Cir. 1989).
62. State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975 (La. 1979). Catanese is a remarkable case for several
reasons. The majority opinion is a concise, scholarly and balanced presentation of all of the technical
and jurisprudential issues involved in the admissibility of polygraph evidence. Though unfavorable to
admission in the case at bar, it opens the door to admissibility under certain conditions and cautiously
entertains the prospect ofgreater admissibility in the future. Finally, Justice Tate's opinion, concurring
in part and dissenting in part, anticipates the very fact situation dealt with in Posado.
63. DeVries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 716 F.2d 939 (1st Cir. 1983); United
States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1981).
64. United States v. Rumell, 642 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d
1233 (7th Cir. 1979).
65. DeVries, 716 F.2d at 945 n.8.
66. N.M. R. Evid. 11-707 (codifying State v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204 (N.M. 1975), and State v.
Brionez, 573 P.2d 224 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977)). New Mexico's polygraph statute is unique. It
specifies the minimum qualifications necessary for a polygrapher to qualify as an "expert witness on
the truthfulness of a witness": "five years' experience" "or equivalent academic training,"
"conducting or reviewing the examination in accordance with the provisions of this rule" and twenty
hours per year of continuing education. It provides that "[slubject to the provisions of these rules,
the opinion of a polygraph examiner may in the discretion of the trial judge be admitted as evidence
as to the truthfulness of any person called as a witness if the examination was performed by a person
who is qualified as an expert polygraph examiner pursuant to the provisions of this rule." It then
specifies how the examination itself is to be conducted and scored and the notice and disclosure
required of a party intending to use polygraph evidence.
67. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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about the causal link between birth defects and the drug Bendectin, ruled that the
Federal Rules of Evidence (Rules) superseded the Frye test.6 8 The Court
emphasized that the basic premise of the Rules, according to Rulet 402, is that "all
relevant evidence is admissible." "Relevant evidence" is defined by Rule 401
as that which has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."70 Rule 702 specifically govern:; the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony by providing that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."' While nothing in Rule 702 makes "general acceptance" a prerequi-
site to admissibility, the Rule does require, according to Daubert, that "the trial
judge ... ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not
only relevant, but reliable."' 2 Scientific evidence is "reliable" if il is scientifically
valid, i.e., "ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of science... derived by the
scientific method."73 It is "relevant" if it "assist~s] the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."'7  The Court emphasized the
"gatekeeping" role of the trial judge, whose task it is to ensure that an expert's
testimony is both reliable and relevant, and expressed confidence that "federal
judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.""
The Daubert Court added some "general observations" in the form of four
factors which it suggested might assist the trial court in its determination of
reliability: (1) whether the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested
according to the scientific method, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review
and publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error, and (4) "general
acceptance," which is still relevant though not determinative. 6 The Court also
noted that Rule 403 permits the trial court to exclude even relevant evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury," and cited with approval the view
that the judge may exercise his discretion under Rule 403 more forcefully with
regard to expert than to lay testimony." In addition, the Court downplayed the
potential for jury confusion, pointing out that "[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the buirden of proof are
68. Id. at 585-89, 113 S. Ct. at 2792-94.
69. Id. at 587, i13 S. Ct. at 2793 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 402).
70. 509 U.S. at 587, i13 S. Ct. at 2794 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401).
71. 509 U.S. at 588, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702).
72. 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
73. Id. 590, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
74. Id. at 590, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 (relying on Fed. R. Evid. 702).
75. 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
76. Id. at 593-94, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
77. Id. at 595, 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (relying on and citing Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991)).
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the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."
Finally, the Court noted that summary judgment and the directed verdict are always
available to the parties in a case.7"
Daubert has been characterized as mandating a "wider gate" but a "more
vigilant gatekeeper." It removed the requirement of "general acceptance" but
replaced it with a more rigorous test of scientific reliability, which is, however,
tempered by a general inclination to allow evidence which has probative worth and
is not overly prejudicial. It was only a matter of time before Daubert would have
its impact on the question of polygraph evidence.
III. How POSADO CHANGES THE LAW
A. The Fundamental Change: No A Priori Rule
Posado clearly and repeatedly states that a per se rule against the admissibility
of polygraph evidence is no longer viable after Daubert. It notes that the Fifth
Circuit per se rule was based on Frye8 and that Daubert expressly rejected the
Frye test. Nowhere, however, does Posado suggest that a per se rule not based on
Frye would be acceptable. Instead, the holding of Posado strongly suggests that
no circuit-wide rule can take the place of the trial court's case-by-case consider-
ation of the relevance, reliability and prejudicial effect of the evidence in question
given the specific circumstances of the case before it.82 In other words, Posado
reads Daubert as not only invalidating the Frye test, but as mandating trial courts
to consider scientific or technical evidence on a case-by-case basis instead of
simply applying an a priori rule, per se or otherwise. Posado therefore changes the
law within the Fifth Circuit not only by doing away with the per se rule against
polygraph evidence, but also by proposing no other rule in its place. The Federal
Rules of Evidence as interpreted by Daubert are the only rules now governing
polygraph evidence within the Fifth Circuit.
The Posado court could have narrowly reasoned that Daubert merely
invalidated the Frye test but did not preclude a non-Frye-based rule against
polygraph evidence. Other courts have so reasoned. The Sixth Circuit, in Conti v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 rejected -an appeal from the Tax Court's
ruling that unstipulated polygraph evidence was not admissible. The Sixth Circuit
determined that it "need not consider whether the Tax Court actually conducted a
proper analysis of the polygraph evidence under the Supreme Court's decision in
78. 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61, 107 S. Ct.
2704, 2714 (1987)).
79. Bonnie J. Davis, Comment, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert and Foret.
A Wider Gate, A More Vigilant Gatekeeper, 54 La. L. Rev. 1307 (1994).
80. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432-33 (5th Cir. 1995).
81. Id. at 432.
82. Id. at 436.
83. 39 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995).
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Daubert."" The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the Tax Court based its decision on
two independent grounds: (1) the Frye test, and (2) the SiXth Circuit rule,
developed in Wolf el v. Holbroo5 5 and Barnier v. Szentmiklosi,s6 which states
that "unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under
Evidence Rule 403."" The Sixth Circuit determined that the Tax Court properly
relied on the Wolfel/Barnier rule (which was based on Federal Rule 403 rather than
on Frye) as an "independent basis to deny the admission of the polygraph
evidence,""M thus implicitly concluding that the rule survived Daubert.
Two district courts within the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion.
The defendant in United States v. Black" sought to introduce the results of
polygraph examinations which he claimed would confirm the veracity of his
testimony and that of a friendly witness. The court denied the delrendant's motion,
relying on the Second Circuit's non-Frye-based per se exclusionary rule developed
in United States v. Bortnovsk90 and United States v. Rea." The court explicitly
stated that "[n]othing in Daubert changes the rationale set orth in Rea and
Bortnovsky" and that "nothing in Dauber would disturb the settlied precedent that
polygraph evidence is neither reliable nor admissible." 2 In United States v.
Lech, 3 the defendant moved to introduce the results of two separate polygraph
examinations by two separate examiners. The court stated thai it was willing to
assume that the proffered evidence met the Daubert reliability criteria, but held that
the probative value of the particular questions asked and answers given was far
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and jury confusion." The continued
viability of the Second Circuit's per se rule against the admission of polygraph
evidence was thus not essential to the court's decision. Neveitheless, the court
considered and rejected the defendant's argument that the rile needed to be
reevaluated after Daubert, calling the argument "tenuous" because "the basis for
the Second Circuit's reluctance to admit polygraph evidence is not based upon its
view that polygraph exams are not generally accepted in the scientific community.
Instead, the Second Circuit's concern... centers upon the methcdology employed
by the polygraph examiner, an important factor under Daubert.'i
84. Id. at 662.
85. 823 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1987).
86. 810 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1987).
87. Conti v. Commissioner of lntemal Revenue, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct 1793 (1995).
88. Id.
89. 831 F. Supp. 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
90. 879 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1989).
91. 958 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1992).
92. Black, 831 F. Supp. at 123.
93. 895 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
94. Id. at 585. See infra text accompanying notes 175-177.
95. 895 F. Supp. at 585-86. Subsequent to these cases and to Posado, the Second Circuit itself
entertained the possibility that, given a suitable record, it would reconsider its position on polygraph
evidence. United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1995).
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These decisions interpreted Daubert as simply requiring that any circuit-wide
rule regarding expert testimony not be based on the Frye "general acceptance" test.
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, has interpreted Daubert (in cases unrelated
to polygraph evidence) as requiring an evidentiary hearing at the trial court level
whenever the admissibility of expert testimony is at issue." Though it has not
ruled on the admissibility of polygraph evidence afterDaubert, it has "encourage[d]
district courts to make specific fact findings concerning their application of Rule
702 and Daubert in each case where the question arises, because such findings will
facilitate this court's appellate review."
Posado's interpretation of Daubert is in accord with the Eleventh Circuit.98
The Posado court acknowledges that in applying this interpretation of Daubert to
polygraph evidence it may be "opening a legal Pandora's box," but expresses its
belief that "the wisdom and experience of our federal district judges will be
required to fashion the principles that will ultimately control the admissibility of
polygraph evidence under Daubert.""
B. Reliability of Polygraph Evidence
While stating that it is "not now hold[ing] that polygraph examinations are
scientifically valid,"'" Posado attempts, albeit in passing, to make the case for
the general reliability of polygraph evidence:
There can be no doubt that tremendous advances have been made in
polygraph instrumentation and technique in the years since Frye ....
Current research indicates that, when given under controlled conditions,
the polygraph technique accurately predicts truth or deception between
seventy and ninety percent of the time. Remaining controversy about test
accuracy is almost unanimously attributed to variations in the integrity of
the testing environment and the qualifications of the examiner. Such
variation also exists in many of the disciplines and for much of the
scientific evidence we routinely find admissible under Rule 702. Further,
there is good indication that polygraph technique and the requirements for
professional polygraphists are becoming progressively more standardized.
In addition, polygraph technique has been and continues to be subjected
to extensive study and publication. Finally, polygraphy is now widely
used by employers and government agencies alike.'
96. United States v. Lee, 25 F.3d 997 (11 th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gates, 20 F.3d 1550
(llth Cir. 1994).
97. Lee, 25 F.3d at 999.
98. It will be interesting to see whether the Eleventh Circuit, in the spirit of its own Lee and
Gates decisions, now strikes down its carefully crafted Piccinonna rules. See United States v.
Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (lth Cir. 1989) (en banc) andsupra text accompanying notes 57 and 61.
99. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 1995).
100. Id. at 434.
101. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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This argument in favor of polygraph reliability is not necessar to the holding,
which is clearly based on the logic of the Federal Rules cf Evidence and
Daubert."'0 It does, however, suggest that trial courts should no longer regard
polygraph evidence as generally unreliable. 3 They should instead approach the
issue of reliability with no preconceptions one way or another.
C. Probative Value Versus Prejudicial Effect
Posado's discussion of probative value versus prejudicial effect-"precisely
the inquiry required of the district court by Rule 403"' 04-is specific to the facts
of the instant case. The court cites "several factors that may operite to counterbal-
ance the potential prejudicial effect of this testimony,"'0 5
First, the defense offered the prosecution the opportunity to participate in the
exams and offered to stipulate as to use and admissibility in advance of knowing
what the results would be. "In such a case, both parties have a ri:;k in the outcome
of the polygraph examination, simultaneously reducing the po,.;sibility of unfair
prejudice and increasing reliability."'06 This is the rationale of those jurisdictions
which allow polygraph evidence only if stipulated.0 7 Reliability is increased
because the defendant, knowing that his freedom is at stake, is likely to respond as
polygraph theory suggests he should. In contrast, a defendant who undertakes a
polygraph exam knowing that an adverse result can be quietly discarded is likely
to remain at ease even when lying. The possibility of unfair prejudice is reduced
because both parties agree to the exam, implicitly accept its relevance and
reliability, and are willing to have the outcome of the case affected by it. In
Posado, however, the prosecution declined the defense's offer, so that neither party
had a risk in the outcome. The Posado court seems to be suggesting that even an
unaccepted offer to stipulate will weigh in favor of admissibility.' °
Second, the evidence in this case was offered in a pre-trial hearing before
a judge. The court cites Bennett in support of the proposition that "[a] district
102. Supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. This is so despite the court's statement that its per
se rule was based on "antiquated concepts about the technical ability of the polygraph" as well as on
"legal precepts that have been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court." Poaado, 57 F.3d at 434.
103. Or as Wright & Graham put it, "a court can no longer take judicial notice that the major
premise is false." 22 Wright & Graham, supra note II. But see State v. Beard, 461 S.E. 2d 486,
493 (W. Va. 1995). which interprets Daubert and Posado as allowing per se inadmissibility based
on general unreliability.
104. 57 F.3d at 435.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
108. Ulmer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 897 F. Supp. 299, A03 (W.D. La. 1995),
following Posado, illustrates a variant of this: in a case where (as in Barrel of Fun) the defendant
insurance company refused to pay a fire claim based on its assertion of arson, the court viewed with
favor a polygraph examination undergone by the plaintiff at the request of the fire marshal even
though the defendant itself did not participate in the examination.
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court judge is much less likely than a lay jury to be intimidated by claims of
scientific validity into assigning an inappropriate evidentiary value to polygraph
evidence."' Bennett allowed polygraph evidence in a probable cause hear-
ing;"0 Posado deals with a suppression hearing. A probable cause hearing is
generally ex parte and may rely on the "totality of the circumstances," including
affidavits and anonymous informants."' A suppression hearing, though not
subject to the rules of evidence (except regarding privileges)," 2 is an ad-
versarial process more akin to a trial, and is often, as in this case, determinative
of the outcome of the trial. If a judge can be relied upon not to give undue
weight to polygraph evidence when hearing a pre-trial motion, maybe he can also
be relied upon not to give undue weight to polygraph evidence when sitting as
the trier of fact in a bench trial. The Posado court may have intended to limit
the scope of its observation to pre-trial motions ("(w]e have consistently held that
the rules of evidence are relaxed in pretrial suppression hearings""'3), but its
logic appears to extend to all hearings or trials before a judge.
Third, this was precisely the fact situation anticipated by Justice (later Fifth
Circuit Judge) Tate in State v. Catanese"' and described by commentators
Wright & Graham as a case in which "the issue turns on the credibility of two
witnesses whose testimony is so diametrically opposed that it can only be
explained on the supposition that one of them is lying."... 5 Here the district
court was "required... to decide between the story told by the officers and that
told by the defendants."" 6 This was "not an unusual situation, and perhaps not
sufficient alone to justify admission of 'tie-breaker' evidence carrying a high
potential for prejudicial effect,"".7 except that there was more: the only
Spanish-speaking officer on the scene, who alone could testify as to what the
Spanish-speaking defendants were told and as to their understanding of whether
they were consenting to a search, was a particularly unreliable witness based on
inconsistencies in his testimony and a past instance of lying. "Taken individual-
ly, each one of these inconsistencies can be explained and may seem inconse-
quential. Taken together, however, we believe that they can be said to enhance
the need for evidence, and therefore its probative value, for clarifying which of
the competing versions of what happened that day is true.""' Impliedly, the
outcome would be different if the officer were not the sole prosecution witness
to the conversation in question or if the officer were more credible. The court
109. Posado, 57 F.3d at 435.
110. Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, Texas, 883 F.2d 400, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1989).
111. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
112. Posado, 57 F.3d at 435 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)).
113. 57F.3dat435.
114. 368 So. 2d 975, 984 (La. 1979) (Tate, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. 22 Wright & Graham, supra note 1i, § 5169.
116. Posado, 57 F.3d at 435.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 435-36.
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does not say whether the same probative value would attach to polygraph
evidence offered by the prosecution (for example, the favorable polygraph results
of a testifying officer) against a sole defense witness of similarly problematic
credibility." 9
In summary, Posado does away with the Fifth Circuit's per se rule against
polygraph evidence but offers no other rule in its place. It requires the trial
courts to approach polygraph evidence on a case-by-case basis in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert. It suggests that polygraph
evidence may be reliable under some circumstances. It offers an example of a
Rule 403 analysis, in which it suggests that (I) an offer to stipulate (and, a
fortiori, an actual stipulation) may reduce the prejudicial effect of polygraph
evidence, (2) a pre-trial hearing before a judge (and maybe any bench trial) is
a less prejudicial setting than a jury trial for such evidence, and (3) the need for
additional, "tie-breaking" evidence in a close case where one witness directly
contradicts the other increases the probative value of polygraph evidence.' 20
IV. ANALYSIS
Few observers would disagree with the Posado court's findings that
"tremendous advances have been made in polygraph instrumentation and
technique in the years since Frye" and that "polygraph technique and the
requirements for professional polygraphists are becoming progressively more
standardized."'' The claim that "the polygraph accurately predicts truth or
deception between seventy and ninety percent of the time," for which Bennett
among other authorities is cited," is more dubious.'23 lIt would be more
accurate to say that estimates of polygraph reliability range from below fifty
percent to over ninety percent and that none of these estimates are free from
methodological difficulties."' Even if a high estimate is accepted it cannot be
taken at face value because of the unequal distribution of guilty and innocent in
the universe of polygraph subjects.' In short, "no overall measure or single,
simple judgment of polygraph testing validity can be established based on
available scientific evidence."'2 6
119. But see Ulmer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 897 F. Supp. 299, 302 (W.D. La. 1995),
for a very different reading of this part of Posado. "[T]he Fifth Circuit's teaching with respect to
this last factor appears to be somewhat counter-intuitive: If the polygraph .vidence is merely 'tie
breaker' evidence, i.e. the trier of fact is required to decide between stoties relatively equal in
plausibility, the evidence may have less probative value compared to its prejudicial effect."
120. But see supra note 119.
121. Posado, 57 F.3d at 434. See supra note 17.
122. Posado, 57 F.3d at 434 n.7.
123. See supra note 44.
124. See supra note 44.
125. Lykken, supra note 44; Beaber, supra note 44.
126. OTA, supra note 11, at 4.
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The court is on stronger ground in stating that "controversy about test
accuracy is almost unanimously attributed to variations in the integrity of the
testing environment and the qualifications of the examiner,' 27 which is
precisely the reason why a case-by-case determination of reliability makes
practical as well as legal sense. In such a determination, evidence can be
introduced to show that some methods of questioning and scoring are more
reliable than others under specified circumstances, that the most reliable methods
were used and that the examiner possess the requisite level of training,
experience and objectivity.'
Posado claims that other disciplines and other types of scientific evidence
which are routinely accepted suffer from variations in reliability similar to those
encountered with polygraph evidence. 9 This, if true, is not an argument for
polygraph evidence but an argument for not singling out polygraph evidence as
uniquely prone to unreliability. Indeed, Daubert requires that "any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted [be] not only relevant, but reli-
able."'3 0  All such evidence should be subjected to the Daubert reliability
criteria or "observations." 3'
State v. Foret, a Louisiana case, is a good example of the application of the
Daubert criteria to expert psychological testimony, 32 The Louisiana Code of
Evidence is largely based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Foret, the
Louisiana Supreme Court announced its intention to follow Daubert and to adopt
the Daubert criteria. 3  The defendant in Foret was convicted in a jury trial
for attempted molestation of a juvenile. The alleged victim's testimony was an
important factor in the jury's determination. That testimony was bolstered by a
psychologist's expert testimony. The psychologist opined that the alleged victim
was telling the truth. To support his conclusions, the psychologist relied on the
supposed "dynamics" of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
(CSAAS). Victims with this syndrome are said to display certain characteristic
reactions and behaviors which distinguish them from children in general.
13 4
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that CSAAS failed at
least three of the Daubert reliability factors.' First, the theory upon which
CSAAS was based was inherently irrefutable (as are many psychological theories,
127. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428,434 (5th Cir. 1995). See OTA, supra note 11. at 95-96.
128. Possibly along the lines of New Mexico's polygraph statute and jurisprudence. See supra
note 66. Also see Ulmer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 897 F. Supp. 299, 303 (W.D. La. 1995),
following Posado, in which the court based its finding of reliability on (among other things) the fact
that the examiner was certified by the state and employed by state law enforcement bodies.
129. 57 F.3d at 434.
130. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795
(1993).
13 I. See supra text accompanying note 76.
132. 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993).
133. Id. at 1121-22.
134. Id. at 1123-27.
135. Id. at 1127.
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especially those belonging to the realm of psychodynamic psychology) and hence
untestable. 36 Second, one study attempting to validate CSAAS as a diagnostic
tool found a thirty-two percent rate of error. The author of the study found the rate
of error acceptable. The court, for the purpose of admissibility of testimony, did
not "' Third, the usefulness, reliability and validity of CSAAS were not general-
ly accepted either in the legal or scientific community.'38 The Louisiana Supreme
Court faulted the trial court for not conducting a reliability analysis and thus failing
to exercise its "gatekeeping" function, though the trial was ccnducted before the
Daubert decision was announced.3
Even more significant than the Daubert-guided reliability analysis, was the
Court's examination of the prejudicial effect of the expert testimony balanced
against its probative worth under Rule 403 (Article 403 in Louisiana). The court
ruled that CSAAS-based testimony was unreliable and, therefore, of extremely low
probative worth. For the purpose of argument, however, the court went on to
assume that it was reliable and to ask whether, as expert testimony purporting to
determine a witness' credibility, it could be helpful to the tier of fact."4  The
court surveyed other jurisdictions and concluded that "they almost uniformly hold
that the testimony is inadmissible" because "[t]estimony by an expert is not
particularly helpful to a jury that must rely upon its own common sense as a
barometer for the evaluation of truthfulness."' 4 The court cited with approval
United States v. Azure, 42 which held that a pediatrician's comment on whether
or not the alleged victim of sexual abuse was telling the truth was improperly
allowed. The court also quoted Azure's citation of United States v. Barnard:"3
136. Id. at 1125. Daubert, relying on such prominent philosophers of the scientific method as
Carl Hempel and Karl Popper, states that a theory must be testable in order to be considered
scientific, and refutable or falsifiable in order to be testable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceut-
icals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-97 (1993). According to Popper, a true
scientific theory predicts that certain events will happen if certain other conditions exist. It can be
tested by creating the conditions and seeing if the predicted events occur. If they don't, the theory
is refuted; if they do, the theory is not "proved" (because a million confirming results do not
guarantee that the million-and-first result won't be different) but it is accepted as the best theory we
have. "Pseudo-scientific" theories appear to possess great explanatory power, but actually explain
nothing. It is impossible to attempt to prove such a theory wrong, because! every phenomenon can
be pointed to by adherents of the theory as "confirmation" of the theory while no phenomenon is
hypothesized in advance as capable of refuting the theory. Popper specificlly cites psychodynamic
(for example. Freudian) theory along with Adlerian psychology and Man.ist historicism as prime
examples of "pseudo-science." Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutitions: The Growth of
Scientific Knowledge 33-59 (3d ed. 1969). See also Carl Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science 19-
49 (1966). Polygraph theory should, in principle, be refutable and testable de:spite the methodological
difficulties encountered thus far. See OTA, supra note I1, at 6-8.
137. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1126.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1127.
140. Id. at 1127-30.
141. Id. at 1127.
142. 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986).
143. 490 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Credibility, however, is for the jury-the jury is the lie detector in the
courtroom.... It is now suggested that psychiatrists and psychologists
have more [expertise in weighing the veracity of a witness] than either
judges orjuries, and that their opinions can be of value to both judges and
juries in determining [credibility]. Perhaps. The effect of receiving such
testimony, however, may be twofold: first, it may cause juries to
surrender their own common sense in weighing testimony; second, it may
produce a trial within a trial on what is a collateral but still an important
matter.'"
Thus, the Foret court held: "[T]he use of CSAAS-based testimony for the purpose
of bolstering a witness' credibility creates a risk of prejudice that outweighs its
questionable probative value."' 43
Foret belongs to a significant line of cases both before and after Daubert
,disallowing psychiatric and psychological testimony purporting to determine a
witness' credibility.'" One of these cases, State v. Alberico,"' did rule that
expert psychological testimony relating to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
was reliable. Moreover, the court found the testimony probative of whether the
victim was raped or sexually abused and not unduly prejudicial. It disallowed such
testimony, however, because it was offered to prove the alleged victim's truthful-
ness and "that is for the jury to decide."'48 The reasoning of these cases is
reminiscent of the cases which have disallowed polygraph evidence, such as the
Fifth Circuit's Barrel of Fun'49 and, to some extent, Louisiana's State v.
Catanese.'" The common thread, in addition to questions of reliability, is the
fear that the trier of fact would be so overawed by expert testimony as to a witness'
credibility'' that it would abdicate its own responsibility to make this determina-
tion."'
Posado suggests that a judge can be relied upon not to give undue weight
to polygraph evidence despite the claim of such evidence to determine a witness'
144. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1128 (citing Azure, 801 F.2d at 340 (citing Barnard, 490 F.2d at 912)).
145. 628 So. 2d at 1129,
146. See, in addition to Azure and Barnard, United States v. Whitted, 994 F.2d 444 (8th Cir.
1993); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Gier v. Educational Service
Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Neb. 1994); State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993).
147. 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993).
148. Id. at 210. New Mexico apparently recognizes no contradiction between excluding expert
psychological testimony relating to credibility and allowing expert polygraph testimony, which by
definition relates to credibility. See supra note 66. A possible explanation is that the psychological
testimony in question was offered to corroborate the victim's testimony against the defendant,
whereas most proffers of polygraph evidence are made, as in Posado, by defendants seeking to
exonerate themselves with their own testimony.
149. Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982).
150. 368 So. 2d 975, 981 (La. 1979).
151. Whether in the form of a psychiatric or psychological opinion or in the form of a
polygrapher's interpretation of the subject's physiological responses.
152. Barrel of Fun, 739 F.2d at 1031; Catanese, 368 So. 2d at 981.
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credibility.' 3 Research suggests that a jury can as well. While there is no
hard data supporting the oft-expressed view that juries are unduly influenced by
polygraph evidence, there are studies indicating that juries are not unduly
influenced, especially when properly instructed."' One such study concluded
that polygraph evidence offered in exoneration of criminal defendants has a
significant but not overwhelming effect on juries' perceptions of guilt, and that
such effect is slightly reduced by the inclusion of a cautionary statement from
the judge."3  Furthermore, as Daubert reminds us, our advcrsarial system is
characterized by "[v]igorous cross-examination" and "presentation of contrary
evidence, " "' so that even if one side presents its "oracle of Delphi" the other
side has the opportunity to present its "oracle of Delphi."
The probative value and prejudicial effect of polygraph evidence vary
according to the nature of the case and the purpose for which the evidence is sought
to be used.' 7 It appears that, in general, probative value is at its greatest and
prejudicial effect at its lowest when the evidence is offered by a criminal defendant,
who is often in need of whatever exculpatory evidence he can get. Conversely,
probative value is at its lowest and prejudicial effect at its greatest when offered
against a criminal defendant, against whom the greater resources and (typically)
greater credibility of the state are already arrayed.'" Posado is certainly not
inconsistent with this view and may even be read to imply it." 9
Some have suggested that a lower threshold of admissibility for a criminal
defendant might be required by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution."6 Support for this view is grounded in Iwo United States
Supreme Court cases which limited the extent to which a legislature or court may
impinge on a defendant's right to present and compel testimony.' 6' The defen-
153. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 1995).
154. Ann Cavoukian & Ronald J. Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in Court:
Some Empirical Findings, 4 Law and Human Behavior 117 (1980).
155. Id.
156. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798
(1993).
157. See Posado, 57 F.3d at 428 and, by implication, State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993).
158. Davis, supra note 79, at 1333; W. Thomas Halbleib, Note, United States v. Piccinonna:
The Eleventh Circuit Adds Another Approach to Polygraph Evidence in the Federal System. 80 Ky.
L.J. 225, 247-49 (Fall, 1991/1992).
159. 57 F.3d at 435-36.
160. Halbleib, supra note 158. See also Paul C. Gianelli and Edward J. linwinkelreid, Scientific
Evidence 257-59 (1986).
161. A third United States Supreme Court case, Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704
(1987), held that the Arkansas' per se rule excluding hypnotically-refreshed testimony impermissibly
infringed on a criminal defendant's right to testify on his or her own behalf. Rock's importance to
the issue of polygraph evidence after Daubert and Posado might be to comp,-l other jurisdictions to
adopt Posado's invalidation of the per se exclusion of polygraph evidence at least where criminal
defendants are concerned.
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dant in Washington v. Texas'62 had been barred by state statute from introducing
the exculpatory testimony of her accomplice. It was undisputed that the
accomplice's testimony would have been relevant and that it was vital to the
defense. The court held that the statute, which the state justified on the grounds of
the presumed unreliability of an accomplice's testimony, was unconstitutional in
that it arbitrarily infringed upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present
witnesses in her favor."6 3 Chief Justice Warren declared that
[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their atten-
dance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the
right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the
prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as
an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the
purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his
own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental
element of due process of law.'"
The defendant in Chambers v. Mississippi'65 was convicted of murdering
a police officer during a riot. Only one witness (another police officer) claimed
to have seen the defendant shoot the officer. Another individual confessed to the
murder on four separate occasions but later repudiated his confession. The
defendant was prevented by Mississippi's "voucher rule"'166 from cross-
examining this individual. In addition, the hearsay rule prevented the defendant
from eliciting testimony from the persons to whom the individual has confessed.
The Supreme, Court reversed the conviction. It found the disallowed testimony
to be both facially reliable and critical to the defendant's case. Moreover, the
court held that "the exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled with the State's
refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine [the individual who had confessed),
denied him a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due
process." '67 The court emphasized that its holding was limited to "the facts
and circumstances of this case" and that it established "no new principles of
constitutional law.""' Chambers nevertheless stands for the proposition that
rules of evidence cannot have the effect of depriving a criminal defendant of his
right to mount a defense.
A polygraph examiner is, of course, an expert witness rather than a fact
witness as in Washington v. Texas and Chambers. His testimony relates not to
the facts themselves but to whether another witness is telling the truth about the
162. 388 U.S. 14, 87 S. Ct. 1920 (1967).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 19, 87 S. Ct. at 1923.
165. 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973).
166. A largely superseded common-law rule where a party may not impeach his own witness.
See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295-96, 93 S. Ct. at 1046.
167. ld. at 302, 93 S. Ct. at 1049.
168. Id. at 302-03, 93 S. Ct. at 1049.
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facts.'" Thus, while the spirit of Washington v. Texas and. Chambers may
apply to polygraph evidence, the holdings probably do not. The right to present
a defense does not necessarily include the right to introduce any expert testimony
whatsoever, exculpatory though it may be.170  "[A]ny and all scientific
testimony or evidence" must be relevant, reliable and not overly prejudicial.'
Nevertheless, Washington v. Texas and Chambers should be kept in mind when
considering the admissibility of polygraph evidence proffered by a criminal
defendant. In a close case, a criminal defendant should prevail.." Additionally,.
a state rule of evidence which deviates from the Federal Rules of Evidence might
have to yield to a criminal defendant's right to present expert testimony which is
relevant, reliable and not unduly prejudicial. Louisiana, for example, provides that
"in a criminal case, an expert witness shall not express an opinion as to the guilt or
innocence of the accused."'" While expert testimony that a ciminal defendant
is telling the truth might be the functional equivalent of an opinion as to his guilt
or innocence, it is not quite the same and, under Washington v. Texas and
Chambers (in addition to Daubert and Posado) should not be disallowed.
Finally, it is axiomatic that polygraph evidence can never be probative if
truthful answers to the questions asked do not unambiguously "make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."' 7 The defendant in
United States v. Lech,' for example, was accused of bribing Board of Education
officials to award him an asbestos removal contract. He sought to introduce
evidence that he truthfully answered "no" when asked during the polygraph
examinations whether he did indeed "bribe" or "try to bribe" the, officials. 76 The
trial court found that the questions related to the defendant's belief about the legal
implications of his actions rather than to any factual circumstances underlying his
belief, and that such information would not assist the jury in its role as trier of
fact.'"
The defendant in United States v. Kwong'" was accused of attempting to
murder an assistant United States attorney by sending her a booby-trapped
169. That is, polygraph evidence is always corroboration or impeachment e'vidence, which is why
the "impeachment exception" of some jurisdictions makes no sense.
170. United States v. Lech, 895 F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Gipson,
24 MJ. 246, 252 (C.M.A. 1987).
171. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786. 2795
(1993).
172. Gipson, 24 M.J. at 252, rejected "the notion that an accused has an independent,
constitutional right to present favorable polygraph evidence," but conceded thal: Washington v. Texas
and Chambers should give the defendant "the benefit of the doubt." 24 M.J. at 252.
173. La. Code Evid. art. 704.
174. Fed. R. Evid. 401.
175. 895 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
176. Id. at 583.
177. Id. at 585.
178. 69 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1995).
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package. He sought to introduce evidence that he truthfully answered "no" when
asked during the polygraph examination whether he "conspire[d] with anyone"
to send the package and whether he was "the one that sent that package."' 79
The trial court ruled, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that the questions were
inherently ambiguous no matter how they were answered: "Kwong, however,
was not charged with conspiracy and thus even a truthful 'no' response would
not preclude a guilty verdict on attempted murder," and "even if Kwong honestly
answered that he did not personally mail the package, this does not mean that he
did not construct the booby-trap and arrange to have it mailed."'"0
V. CONCLUSION
A per se rule against the admissibility of polygraph evidence is "no longer
viable (at least not in the Fifth Circuit] after Daubert.''. An evidentiary
hearing should be held whenever polygraph evidence is offered."' The
evidence must be both relevant and reliable' 3 and its probative value must not
be "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'"
Polygraph evidence is capable of attaining an acceptable level of reliabili-
ty.8 5  Its potential prejudicial effect' 6 can be offset by the need for the
evidence and the use to which it is put.'87 In general, probative value is at its
greatest and prejudicial effect at its lowest when the evidence is offered by a
criminal defendant, when eyewitnesses are few and when the prosecution was
offered an opportunity to participate in and stipulate to the polygraph examina-
tion.
A party seeking to admit polygraph evidence should ensure the highest
degree of reliability possible. This can be done by (1) selecting an examiner or
examiners whose credentials, experience and reputation will be relatively
unassailable by the opposing party, (2) ascertaining that the examiner or
examiners employ whichever methods of questioning and scoring have been
shown by research to be appropriate for the subject, circumstances and type of
case involved, and that the questions asked are unambiguously probative, (3)
179. Id. at 667.
180. Id. at 668.
181. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1995).
182. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795
(1993), But see United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500 (5th Cir. 1996), holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a hearing when the offered evidence clearly
failed the relevance test.
183. 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
184. Fed. R. Evid. 403; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-98.
185. Posado, 57 F.3d at 433-35.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 152-155.
187. Posado, 57 F.3d at 435-36.
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engaging two separate examiners and having each examiner conduct two separate
sets of -tests, (4) inviting the opposing party to participate in the tests and
offering to stipulate in advance to the admissibility of the results, and (5)
possibly arranging for yet a third polygraph expert to testify as to the qualifica-
tions of the examiners and the soundness of their methodology.
A party should be prepared to show the specific need for the polygraph
evidence. A scarcity of eyewitnesses, a critical issue whose resolution depends
on which of two witnesses is telling the truth, some reason to doubt the veracity
of the other party's witness, or a need to balance the greater perceived credibility
of the other party's witness (e.g. a police officer) or lesser perceived credibility
of one's own (e.g. a criminal defendant) are possible reasons for wanting to
make use of polygraph evidence.
A party seeking to admit polygraph evidence for pre-tri'al purposes should
argue for a lower threshold of admissibility in such circumstances. The same
argument can be made if the setting is a bench trial. If the setting is a jury trial,
research should be cited demonstrating that juries are not unduly influenced by
polygraph evidence and that proper instruction can prevent this from happen-
ing.' A party who is a criminal defendant should cite Washington v. Texas,
Chambers and Posado in support of a lower threshold oF admissibility for
polygraph evidence offered by a criminal defendant. Finally,, any party seeking
to admit polygraph evidence should remind the court of the "liberal thrust" of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert.
A party opposing the introduction of polygraph evidence can no longer argue
that it is inherently unreliable or prejudicial. The party muit either attack the
reliability of the specific evidence in question, show that it is unduly prejudicial
under the circumstances, or claim that the other party did not show a need for
the evidence. Opposition to reliable polygraph evidence will be most successful
when there was no offer to stipulate or when there is already an abundance of
witnesses and evidence.
A trial judge should approach the admissibility of polygraph evidence by
first requiring the party seeking its admission to demonstrate its reliability. The
same party should then be required to show how such evidence will assist the
trier of fact. The mild, rebuttable presumption should be that non-stipulated
polygraph evidence is neither necessary nor desirable. It should, in practice, be
difficult for a party other than a criminal defendant to overcome this presumption
absent unusual circumstances such as an extreme scarcity of evidence in a close
case. A criminal defendant, on the other hand, should be allowed to go forward
with polygraph evidence if it is reliable and can reasonably be expected to help
his case. Once the requisite showings of reliability and probative value are
made, the burden should shift to the party opposing the evidence to show that it
is unduly prejudicial, confusing or misleading given the specific circumstances
of the case. Of course, once a party's polygraph evidence is admitted, the
188. See supra text accompanying footnotes 152-155.
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opposing party may then wish to offer its own polygraph evidence. In such a
case the required threshold should, in fairness, be quite low.
Perhaps Posado has not opened Pandora's box after all. Polygraph evidence
has not gone from per se inadmissible to per se admissible.' 9 It remains, and
should remain, disfavored. Posado may, in the end, result in only a modest
increase in the admission of polygraph evidence, primarily in criminal cases. It
will almost certainly result in an increase in the workload of trial judges.
Yigal Bander
1S9. See United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding no abuse of discretion
in the district court's refusal to admit polygraph evidence); United States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp.
737 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (refusing to admit polygraph evidence). Dominguez offers its own list of ten
factors to be considered in determining whether probative value is outweighed by prejudice. 902 F.
Supp. at 740.
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